Vladimir Ryzhkov is the leader in the Duma (lower house) of the Our Home-Russia (NDR) faction and is the youngest of Russia's prominent politicians. Despite his youth, Ryzhkov is an experienced and respected politician, having been first elected to the Duma in 1993 when he was not yet 30.

Ryzhkov's political career got off to a flying start - within two years of his election he was appointed to the post of deputy chairman of the Duma.

Following the sacking of Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin's (also leader of the NDR movement) government in early 1998 NDR ceased to be Russia's "Party of Power." Ryzhkov sensed the opportunity this change in the party's status provided and used it to distance the movement from Russia's notoriously unpopular political elite.

Since that time Ryzhkov has attempted to consolidate NDR as a genuine political movement with a centrist orientation.

Together with the then -leader of the NDR Duma faction, Alexander Shokhin, Ryzhkov began to use the faction's weight to popularize its new stance.

The plan fell through because of interference from Victor Chernomyrdin who attempted to use the party as a vehicle to return to his former position.

But last fall, after Chernomyrdin failed to secure the support of the Duma for his return to the post of prime minister, he responded by removing Shokhin from his position as factional leader. Chernomyrdin then offered the position to Ryzhkov. Demonstrating his loyalty to Chernomyrdin, Ryzhkov accepted the position of factional leader, despite this requiring his resignation from the position of deputy chairman of the Duma.

Ryzhkov refuses to discuss his opinion about Chernomyrdin.

But he spoke to RJ about his views on impeachment proceedings against the president, the government and NATO bombing in Yugoslavia.

Russia Journal: Let's begin with the impeachment proceedings against President Boris Yeltsin. What's the likelihood of them actually occuring, and what do you think about the change of date on which the Duma (lower house of parliament) voted two weeks ago?

Vladimir Ryzhkov: I think we can say with certainty that the impeachment vote will go ahead. It will take two or three days, from May 13 to the 15. There's an 80 percent chance that at least on one of the five charges against Yeltsin, the necessary majority of more than 300 votes will be raised. Most likely, it will be the point on Chechnya.

If impeachment does go ahead, it will be just the beginning of a whole process, which, if we look at the Constitution, should take about three months. Maybe it will take even less time.

As for whether the impeachment will lead to President Yeltsin's having to step down, I don't think there's any chance that that will happen. It's a very complex procedure which will involve the the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the upper house. There are only two cases in which Yeltsin could end up having to step down. First, if he does something unthinkable...

RJ: What kind of unthinkable thing could he do?

VR: Well, yes, what could he do?

RJ: Fire Primakov?

VR: No. Even if there were to be a change of government, there are plenty of different scenarios there. It all depends whose point of view you take.

The second scenario in which he could lose out is if he does nothing at all. Now, he has room to maneuver, he can take action, speak, make his thoughts clear. So, he'll be impeached only if he makes some serious mistake or doesn't do anything at all.

RJ: Before the actual voting, though, there's a procedural issue to be dealt with. How likely is it that amendments will be made to the open voting procedure?

VR: It's 100 percent likely that amendments will be made. On Wednesday, it's certain that amendments will be adopted, which means we will vote by roll call. Yabloko, the left-wing parties, and probably the LDPR will vote in favor of the amendments. Then there won't be any obstacles for going ahead with the impeachment vote.

RJ: The fact that the date for the vote was changed - is that the result of some kind of bargaining between the Duma and the president, or is it the Duma's own initiative?

VR: The president was categorically against any postponement. He wants this whole nightmare to be over and done with as soon as possible, rather than having it all dragging on and on. I don't know exactly why the left bloc made this decision. I can guess, though. It's advantageous for them to leave things as they are. In this way, they keep pressure on the president because he knows they've got the impeachment card up their sleeve.

RJ: Yabloko explains its stance by saying that impeachment is necessary so that present and future "rulers" get the message that they can be held responsible for their acts and decisions. Do you think this argument carries any weight? After all, if we follow this logic, the people can be held responsible too for their choice.

VR: This argument reminds me of the logic used by the United States with regard to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That logic stated that if you have the bomb, you have to use it, to show the world how awful the consequences are. Yabloko's position follows the same line of thinking.

RJ: So, we have the impeachment procedure in our law books, and we're going to prove that it works?

VR: Yes. We've got the bomb, lets blow it up, so that everyone can see how terrible it is. That's Yabloko's logic- deter by example.

NDR's (Our Home Is Russia) logic is completely the opposite. What we are saying is that if this impeachment bomb goes off, it will be Russia's Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We're saying that, yes, the weapon is there, we take everyone's word for it, we believe it can cause mass destruction, but we don't want to see it explode. That's the difference in our thinking. In my opinion, any other logic is absurd.

RJ: But what are these disastrous consequences? Why would impeachment be like Russia's Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

VR: Why do I draw such a comparison? Because the vote has been postponed for a month, and outside the Duma building, at the entrance, there's a crowd of people who won't let anyone pass. They're calling for Yeltsin's resignation. They're all opposed to Yeltsin. And then tomorrow, his supporters will turn up, just as convinced that they're right.

RJ: Does he have those kind of supporters?

VR: Yes, he really does. It's a big mistake to think he hasn't got support. If the charges against Yeltsin are supported, then we'll be in for another three months of political instability as the Constitutional Court and the Federation Council examine the matter. You can imagine what kind of political fight that will be: all the compromising material that will be dredged up, the search for arguments and counter-arguments, witnesses and counter-witnesses. In other words, we'll be guaranteed three months of total political instability.

Everyone will be asking, too, whether Primakov is doing enough to stop the impeachment procedure. And yet another question will be whether Yeltsin would be better off keeping Primakov, or sending him into retirement. Finally, should the Duma just not be dissolved? You see, these are all questions with serious consequences. Again, I would point out that I don't think anything will happen ultimately, but instability will be guaranteed.

RJ: And if something does happen?

VR: If something does happen, it would be even worse, it would be like a medieval plague. Why? Because it would mean Yeltsin's having to leave office. We don't know who will be prime minister by then, and it's the prime minister who would act as interim president for three months until new elections could be held. This would mean that the presidential elections would take place just before the parliamentary ones. In other words, there would be complete chaos, you'd have one campaign coming right after the other. The country and economy are in a mess, we have a sovereign default, there'll be no one to deal with economic issues. And so I'm asking the instigators of this impeachment procedure, what good will come of it?

RJ: And what do they say?

VR: Nothing, they smile enigmatically and postpone the vote for a month. That's why NDR is taking such a firm stance. We say loudly and clearly that this whole idea is dangerous for Russia, especially at a time of economic crisis and war in the Balkans. Time and time again, we've called for the vote to be held on a definite date, or to be simply postponed indefinitely. It's either that or we go ahead as soon as possible. The supporters of impeachment have chosen the worst scenario. They've postponed the vote, but have named a definite date. And then we'll come to that date, and they'll postpone the vote again. It's like docking a dog's tail, only instead of just lopping it off, you cut it little slice by little slice.

RJ: But most people realize now that the issue here isn't making Yeltsin leave office, it's all about pursuit of personal political aims. Maybe it's better that things drag on.

VR: It's clear to me that the left bloc has only one thing in mind - the December parliamentary elections and increasing its own popularity. That's all. They couldn't give a hoot about anything else.

RJ: Earlier, you said that if the impeachment procedure goes ahead, Yeltsin will have to lean on the government, the regional governors and so on, use his influence to manipulate the situation. What could this mean for the government? What changes could be in store?

VR: Everyone is trying to manipulate the government at the moment. The Duma, too. It says it's the government's main defender, and tells the president not to dare sack the government, or else... The president manipulates the government when he says that Primakov is useful now, but as for later, we will see. Unfortunately, the government is in a weak position, dependent on the caprices of both the Duma and the president.

RJ: The president has a month then, before the impeachment vote. He could sack the government, propose as prime minister a candidate he knows the Duma won't accept, and if his candidate is rejected three times, he can dissolve the Duma. But now, the president won't be able to dissolve the Duma.

VR: No, now the Duma can hold the impeachment vote any day it likes. Once the amendments to the voting procedure have been made, it'll be like just pushing a button. Yeltsin wouldn't have time to dissolve the Duma.

RJ: So, if the president could threaten to use his power to dismiss the government, it would only be like waving a red rag at a bull - a way to get the left bloc even more geared up for a fight. Or could the president still use this power to his advantage?

VR: The best thing for Yeltsin to do now would be to leave the government in place, and to rally all his material, political, intellectual and media resources in order to counter-attack the left-wing opposition in the Duma. He has plenty of opportunities at his disposal. It's all a question of professionalism, his own professionalism and that of his team.

RJ: But it is nonetheless possible that Yeltsin, as he's been known to do in the past, could do something irrational and dismiss the government. Looking at the different potential candidates for the job of prime minister, what turn could events take? What would happen if, say, Luzhkov were appointed to replace Primakov?

VR: The Duma would approve his appointment, I'm sure of that.

RJ: And then what?

VR: The same as always. Friendship gives way to rivalry, rivalry becomes open hostility, then there's a new round of conflict with the Duma. That's the political model at which we've arrived, and so long as we continue to play out this tired old scenario, nothing will change. It's a vicious circle.

RJ: No matter who is the candidate in question?

VR: No matter who. We'll just see the same thing repeating itself over and over.

RJ: What if Chubais were to be proposed as prime minister, what then?

VR: The Duma wouldn't give its approval. There'd be a constitutional crisis. One article of the Constitution gives the president the right to dissolve the Duma, another denies him that right. So he decrees the dissolution and then asks the Constitutional Court to rule on whether or not his decision is in keeping with the law. In that case, there would be an early election and the Duma would be perfectly happy. But the government still wouldn't be able to function properly. It would find itself faced with the same legal chaos, the same tangle of social and budget issues. It would be a provisional government, constantly hammered by the new Duma. And a whole year would go by before the new Duma could be legally dissolved. Everyone knows too, that the new Duma would be even more skewed to the left than the present one.

RJ: What if Yeltsin settles for a compromise figure like Viktor Chernomyrdin?

VR: Chernomyrdin isn't a compromise figure. The events of last September showed us that.

RJ: And Egor Stroev?

VR: Stroev would be no different than Primakov. There'd be three weeks of support, then intrigues would begin.

RJ: Grigorii Yavlinskii?

VR: The Duma wouldn't accept him.

RJ: What about someone from the armed forces or law enforcement agencies?

VR: Someone like that the Duma would approve, but a month would go by, and attacks would begin.

RJ: What do you mean by that?

VR: I mean that it would make no difference; the problem lies in our political model. No political party is going to take upon itself responsibility for this government. Yeltsin won't either. Whoever is prime minister, they can expect to go the same way as Chernomyrdin, Kirienko, and perhaps Primakov.

RJ: What does Yavlinskii think about early elections?

VR: He'd be only too happy to see the elections moved forward. So would the Communists.

RJ: Concerning Yugoslavia, how realistic is NDR's position?

VR: We support the initiative of the Yugoslav people and parliament to join a union with Russia and Belarus. At the same time, we are responsible politicians and we have to be aware of the obstacles in the way. The biggest problem is, of course, the fact that a war is presently underway in Yugoslavia. According to the terms of the treaty, there would also be a common defense policy, we would be supplying Yugoslavia with arms, and we would have a common border policy. All this means that Russia would find itself responsible for helping Yugoslavia defend itself from air strikes and so on. We must not forget that Yugoslavia itself is not united on the issue of union. Montenegro, which is part of the Yugoslav Federation, is against the idea, Vojevodina, part of Serbia, is also against it. Another thing is that so far, the Russia-Belarus union only really exists on paper. How can we talk about union with Yugoslavia, when we haven't yet gone beyond statements and declarations with Belarus? We would also have to look at the accession procedure. That isn't clear yet. So, yes, NDR supports the idea, but there's still a long way to go, and we must ensure that any steps we take do not draw Russia into armed conflict with any country or group of countries.

RJ: So, as a patriot, this union of "Slavic brother peoples" appeals to you as a project for the future, but as a realist, you understand that it's not something feasible at the moment.

VR: As a realist, I don't see how we can proceed with this project under present conditions.