If one collects all the rumors surrounding the new Russian government's program, it becomes a real detective story. Even now, with work on the program nearly finished and only the government's approval of the draft to go, there are stunning assumptions in the press.

For example, that President Vladimir Putin may base his strategy not on the program of the Center for Strategic Research, but on that of Yury Masliukov.

It is well known that Putin himself founded the center and gave it the task of creating an economic strategy for Russia. He appointed German Gref and Aleksei Kudrin as the heads and met with them regularly to discuss progress. He made former Deputy Minister Kudrin the minister of finance and vice premier responsible for economic departments of the government, and he named Gref, also a former deputy minister, head of the newly formed economic superministry that replaced the three former ministries.

All this to then take the proposed Communist opposition program, without even having discussed the center's program, and appoint Kudrin and Gref to carry out someone else's ideas? This would be a very strange step, and it is worth explaining the logic behind it.

It is true that, when Mikhail Kasyanov was asked his opinion on Gref's program at his confirmation by parliament as head of government, he said he had not read it. But this may have been only the formal truth: Insofar as the program had not been presented to the government as an official document, anything Kasyanov may have read could only be considered a draft text.

But it is hard to believe that the acting premier would be entirely unfamiliar with the document intended to determine the direction of the government for the next 10 years.

This was probably an intelligent tactical move by a known diplomat and financier: The Communist Party spoke out strongly against Gref's program when the premier's candidacy was under discussion, and Kasyanov did not want to force leader Gennady Zyuganov's supporters into a conciliatory position over his candidacy.

Now that the work is finished, Kasyanov cannot say he is unfamiliar with the final text. On May 22, he introduced the team in Gref's Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. That very evening, Gref, along with colleagues Yevgeny Gavrilenkov and Mikhail Dmitriev, presented the program prepared by his team in a round table discussion with the Moscow Carnegie Center.

Judging by statements, the program reflects a completely liberal approach to economics. The strategic aim is to reinforce the growth tendency that has appeared in the last year and a half. A key resource is the huge amount of currency leaving Russia: about $18 billion a year. If even a half of this amount can be reinvested in Russia, the GDP would rise by 10 percent a year. The current program promises a yearly growth rate of just above 5 percent with a 70 percent total GDP increase by 2010.

To create a favorable investment climate, the first step is to protect private property, mainly by strengthening the weak court system. The second step is to lower the tax burden on producers. The reduced budget income would be compensated for by reduced spending, primarily in social areas. A key part of this is a reform of the pension system and of utilities and housing, which in 1997 received more in subsidies than defense and law and order enforcement combined.

The program's authors recognize the political and social risk involved in the proposed reforms. In their defense, they offer two main arguments. Firstly, the government will not have the money to fulfil its social obligations anyway. If the current pension system is not reformed, for example, it will collapse in a matter of years because of the aging population and increase in the number of pensioners. In 2010, it will be impossible to cover pension payments with tax collection.

The second point is that there is no conflict between economic and social goals. There is a conflict between unreasonable social goals and more rational ones. The current discounts, mainly those affecting residential maintenance and utilities, essentially redistribute money from the poor to the rich. The proposed reform would reverse this flow.

The political difficulty is that the population of Russia grew up in a world where market relations were forbidden fruit. It does not yet fully understand the dynamics of the market, nor does it always properly assess its own interests. This becomes a breeding ground for leftist populism.

The problem is that Russian reformers usually explain their policy poorly and organize essential reforms badly. The recent sharp drop in Russian share values, unexpected and hard to explain in the light of economic successes, shows how weak the improvement in the Russian economy is.